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ABSTRACT Moral stories are pervasive in human culture, forming the basis of religious
texts, folklore, and newspaper articles. We used a linear transmission chain procedure to test
three competing hypotheses: (1) that moral content in general is preferentially transmitted
between individuals compared to non-moral content; (2) that negativity bias leads speciﬁcally
to morally bad content being preferentially transmitted; and (3) that a bias towards pro-social
information leads speciﬁcally to morally good content being preferentially transmitted. While
we found no support for a bias for moral content in general, we did ﬁnd that morally good
content was transmitted with greater ﬁdelity than neutral or morally bad content, with ratings
of morally good content but not morally bad content predicting transmission. Moral content,
therefore, appears to be particularly culturally potent when it describes the ‘virtuous’ rather
than the ‘sinful’. A second study repeated the ﬁrst but also tested the inﬂuence of physio-
logical arousal on transmission by measuring the electrodermal activity of participants. This
study also found that morally good content was transmitted with greater ﬁdelity than neutral
or morally bad content and that physiological arousal had a negative effect on transmission
with more arousing material being less faithfully transmitted. These results suggest that the
communication of content relating to moral virtue might serve to avoid negative impression
formation and promote social bonding, and that this might partially explain the ubiquity of
moral content in human culture.
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Introduction
Information about morality—deﬁned by Ayala (2010) as “valuejudgments concerning human behaviour” (p. 9016)— per-vades human culture, in religious texts, folklore, fables and
news stories. Moral information might be an explicit proclama-
tion of what is moral or amoral, or a more implicit illustration of
the moral norms of a social group. Morality is characterised by
some authors as an adaptation, built upon emotions that are
themselves adaptive, with speciﬁc moral codes emerging via gene-
culture coevolution (Gintis et al., 2008; Graham et al., 2013;
Norenzayan, 2014). While disagreement exists about the
sequences of events and selection pressures underpinning the
human capacity for morality, there is general agreement that the
emergence and evolution of moral codes and norms is only
possible through cultural transmission (Ayala, 2010; Haidt and
Joseph, 2004, McNamara et al., 2019). The process by which
moral content is embedded into culturally transmitted stories and
artefacts is poorly understood, however. Here, we present two
studies investigating cognitive content biases towards moral
information.
A cognitive content bias is a predisposition that humans have
for attending to, recalling, or re-producing, certain kinds of
information. (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Barrett and Nyhof,
2001; Henrich and McElreath, 2003). Evolutionary psychologists
argue that such biases exist because they were adaptive in
ancestral environments (e.g., tracking social relationships in
complex groups), and that they modify the content and structure
of cultural knowledge and artefacts, which makes them increas-
ingly transmittable (Barrett and Nyhof, 2001; Laland and Brown,
2011; Mesoudi, 2016). Studies have demonstrated biases for a
number of types of content: ecological information relevant to
health and survival, hereafter survival content (Nairne, 2010;
Stubbersﬁeld et al., 2015); information relevant to social rela-
tionships and interaction, hereafter social content (Mesoudi et al.,
2006; Stubbersﬁeld et al., 2015), and information evoking an
emotional response, hereafter emotional content (Eriksson and
Coultas, 2014; Heath et al., 2001; Stubbersﬁeld et al., 2017). A
number of studies investigating biases in transmission have used
the transmission chain, or serial reproduction, paradigm, in
which experimental material is passed along a linear ‘chain’ of
individuals. First developed by Bartlett (1932), this method allows
researchers to assess which types of information are preserved
with the greatest ﬁdelity as they are passed along the chain, in
turn revealing the biases in social transmission which inﬂuence
the transmission and evolution of culture (Mesoudi and Whiten,
2008; Mesoudi et al., 2006). While evidence for a number of
content biases in transmission has been documented (See Stub-
bersﬁeld et al., 2018 for a review) a content bias for morally
relevant content has yet to be experimentally examined.
Based on Haidt and Joseph’s (2004) moral foundations theory,
one might expect a transmission bias for all morally relevant
information, because any information relevant to the moral
foundations would be salient. This hypothesis has not yet been
directly tested but indirect evidence for a bias for moral content
comes from the literature on impression formation. Wojciszke
et al. (1998) for example, found that morality-related information
played a more important role in global impression formation and
was more cognitively accessible than competence-related infor-
mation. Ybarra et al. (2001) found that participants were more
sensitive to person-relevant information from the morality
domain than the competence domain. Van Leeuwen et al. (2012)
used a memory confusion paradigm and found that participants
spontaneously categorised along a morality dimension but not
along a competence dimension. Morality also inﬂuences the
perception of speciﬁc actions: Pizarro et al. (2006) gave partici-
pants one of two vignettes—the ﬁrst about a man intentionally
leaving a restaurant without paying and the second about a man
who forgot to pay for his meal. Participants who read the vignette
with the intentional— but not the accidental—moral transgres-
sion distorted the recalled amount to be larger than it was when
asked for the size of the bill. Taken together, these studies suggest
that moral content is particularly salient when forming impres-
sions of other people and their actions.
Another known bias which could inﬂuence the transmission of
moral content is a general negativity bias. Research on memory,
perception, decision making and impression formation has sug-
gested that negative entities (such as events, objects or personal
traits) are more salient than their positive counterparts (Baume-
ister et al., 2001; Rozin and Royzman, 2001). It has been sug-
gested that this bias is adaptive, because negative entities are likely
to incur greater costs on an individual than positive entities incur
beneﬁts (Rozin and Royzman, 2001). A suggestion supported by
Fessler et al. (2014), who found that participants were more
credulous of negatively framed than positively framed informa-
tion and that negative content was over-represented in a corpus
of online urban legends and supernatural beliefs. Bebbington
et al. (2016) also demonstrated a transmission advantage for
negatively valenced content over positively valenced content, and
found that ambiguous content is more likely to become negative
than positive through transmission. Similarly, Walker and Blaine
(1991) used a naturalistic “ﬁeld-experiment” to demonstrate that
rumours forecasting unpleasant consequences have an advantage
in social transmission over rumours forecasting pleasant con-
sequences. In addition, other studies have found a negativity bias
in emotional expression in the arts (see Brand et al., 2019; Morin
and Acerbi, 2017). Based on these ﬁndings it is feasible that
content featuring immoral behaviour will be more salient and
better transmitted than content featuring virtuous behaviour,
because immoral agents could be perceived as more hazardous
than moral agents are beneﬁcial.
Alternatively, a positivity bias might shape the transmission of
moral content. Experimental research has found a preference for
choosing to transmit positively valenced vignettes over negatively
valenced equivalents (van Leeuwen et al., 2018). Studies using
“real world” data have found an advantage for positive content,
with positively valenced messages being more frequently and
more widely shared on social media than negative content
(Ferrara and Yang, 2015a; Ferrara and Yang, 2015b; Fu et al.,
2016) and urban legends featuring amusing content being more
common than those featuring other, negative emotions (Stub-
bersﬁeld et al., 2018). In addition, research has shown that
children seek out and transmit content which supports a positive,
pro-social, evaluation of their in-group over other types of
information, including negative information about their out-
group (Over et al., 2017). Therefore, the possibility of virtuous
content being advantaged in transmission should also be con-
sidered. We therefore examine the transmission of both morally
good content and morally bad content. In Study 1 we test three
alternative hypotheses relating to the transmission of moral
information in a linear transmission chain. In Study 2 we extend
on Study 1 by including a measure of physiological arousal in
order to examine the role of emotion in the transmission of
moral information.
Study 1
The present research investigates the social transmission of moral
and morally neutral (hereafter “non-moral”) content. We pro-
duced a series of vignettes, each with two versions, moral and
non-moral. The moral version of each vignette features either a
deliberately virtuous behaviour, which promotes or enhances
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social life and interaction (hereafter “morally good”), or a delib-
erately morally transgressive act, which suggests selﬁshness or
anti-sociality (hereafter “morally bad”). Non-moral versions of
the same vignettes feature the same outcomes, but they are not
brought about intentionally. For instance, in a vignette describing
the damage of a person’s property, in the moral version it would
be due to vandalism and in the non-moral version it would be
due to accidental damage. A pre-test study (see Supplementary
Material (SM) 1 and 2) validated the material by having parti-
cipants (N= 133) rate the vignettes (see SM3) for moral content
(good and bad) and other content that might inﬂuence recall or
transmission (social information, gender stereotype consistency,
survival information). Vignettes were used in the study if parti-
cipants in the pre-test rated the moral version as signiﬁcantly
higher in either morally good or morally bad content than the
non-moral version. Because moral content could have a trans-
mission advantage simply because of its social and emotive nature
(Graham et al., 2013; Pizarro, 2000), we address the question of
whether a speciﬁc content bias exists for moral information,
rather than moral content being favoured simply because it is
social or emotive, by testing morality as a separate predictor of
transmission alongside measures of social and emotive content.
The present study primarily seeks to examine three competing
hypotheses:
1. There is a cognitive bias for transmitting general moral
information. Consistent with research suggesting a moral infor-
mation bias in the domains of impression formation and cate-
gorisation, moral information—both good and bad—may be
preferentially transmitted over non-moral information (H1).
2. There is a cognitive bias for transmitting morally bad
information. Consistent with research suggesting a negativity bias
in transmission chains and recall, morally bad information may
be preferentially transmitted over non-moral or morally good
information (H2).
3. There is a cognitive bias for transmitting morally good
information. Consistent with research suggesting a bias for
transmitting positive information in experimental settings and on
social media, morally good information may be preferentially
transmitted over non-moral or morally bad information (H3).
Material and methods
Participants. Forty participants (32 female, 7 male, 1 other) aged
17 to 43 years (M= 21.58, SD= 4.55) took part. All participants
gave their informed consent.
Materials. Vignettes were 19 to 62 words and contained 3 to 8
propositions (determined through propositional analysis
(Kintsch, 1974)). See below for examples (bolded sections illus-
trate differences between versions and did not appear as such to
participants).
Tyre–Non-moral version
Nigel returned to his bike after visiting his friends to ﬁnd that it
had a ﬂat tyre. The tyre had been punctured by a small thorn.
Now he would have to walk two miles home in the pouring rain.
Nigel was so angry at the puncture he kicked a wall.
Tyre–Moral version
Nigel returned to his bike after visiting his friends to ﬁnd that it
had a ﬂat tyre. The tyre had been deliberately slashed by
someone. Now he would have to walk two miles home in the
pouring rain. Nigel was so angry at the puncture he kicked a wall.
The results of the pre-test were used to determine ten vignettes
most appropriate for analyses, i.e., those with fewest possible
confounds between moral and non-moral versions. Participants
in the pre-test also classiﬁed the vignettes according to the most
prominent emotion (anger, disgust, elevation, gratitude, guilt/
shame, happiness), and rated the vignettes for emotional
intensity, moral goodness, moral badness, survival information,
social information, male stereotype consistency, and female
stereotype consistency (see SM1–SM3).
Design. A linear transmission chain design was used (see Mesoudi
and Whiten, 2008, for further details on this design and its use).
This design was used as it allows for the examination of cumu-
lative effects over generations, an advantage over a single gen-
eration design when considering recall and cultural transmission.
As in previous research (Mesoudi and Whiten, 2004; Mesoudi
et al., 2006), ten chains comprised of four participants, or ‘gen-
erations’ were used. The ﬁrst participant in each of the ten chains
received all ten vignettes. Participants received one of two sets of
vignettes, with an equal mix of moral and non-moral vignettes.
Half the participants received Set A, while half received Set B.
Each set contained the same vignettes but with opposite versions,
i.e., Set A would have the moral version of the ‘Tyre’ vignette,
while Set B would contain the non-moral version, and so on. The
second participant in a chain received all text generated by the
ﬁrst participant, and so on.
Procedure. Participants were presented with the vignettes on a
computer screen. After reading ﬁve vignettes, they were asked to
recall each one with a short prompt: e.g., “Please type in the box
provided, as accurately as you can remember, the ‘Tyre’ story (the
story about Nigel)”. Participants were informed that the product
of their recall would be used as the material for the next parti-
cipant in the chain.
Coding. Recalled material was coded for the presence of propo-
sitions found in the original version. Coding reliability was
assessed by having an independent coder, blind to the hypothesis,
code 10% of the material. The independent coder and experi-
menter were highly consistent (r= 0.95, p < .001). In cases of
disagreement the ﬁrst coder’s decision stood. Sensitivity tests were
conducted to assess coder reliability (see below and SM10).
Statistical analysis. To test H1 a generalised linear mixed effects
model (GLMM) was used to predict the proportion of original
propositions correctly recalled, with moral vs. non-moral vign-
ette version as a ﬁxed effect, with nested random effects of
vignette in participant, participant in generation, and generation
in vignette set. To test H2 and H3 a second GLMM was con-
structed to predict proportion of original propositions correctly
recalled, including participant age, participant gender, word
count, number of propositions, emotion, emotional intensity,
moral good score, moral bad score, survival information score,
social information score, male stereotype consistency score,
female stereotype consistency score and generation as ﬁxed
effects and the same nested random effects. Predictors were
removed if doing so did not impair model ﬁt, determined by
Akaike information criterion (AIC; see Burnham and Anderson,
2002). No speciﬁc ΔAIC was used to determine predictor
removal but all models with ΔAIC < 2 relative to the best-ﬁtting
model were included in model averaging (see SM4 for AICs of
each model produced).
Analyses was conducted using the lme4 package (Bates et al.,
2014) in R versions 3.1.1 (R Core Team, 2014) and 3.2.2 (R Core
Team, 2016) to ﬁt all GLMMs, with multiple pair-wise
comparisons conducted using the multcomp package (Hothorn
et al., 2008). Model comparisons and averaging were performed,
and relative importance measures (computed by the sum of AIC
weights across all of the models where the variable occurs)
determined using the MuMIn package (Bartoń, 2014). All non-
categorical variables were centred on the mean.
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Results. The moral proposition appearing in the original material
was recalled in the majority cases (77%), and the moral propo-
sition survived to the end of the majority of chains where it was
present in the original material (60%). However, moral versions
of vignettes were not transmitted with higher ﬁdelity than non-
moral versions (vs. generation-only model, X21= .12, p > .05),
suggesting no general bias for moral content versus non-moral
content in transmission. This was also found when just exam-
ining the recall of the key proposition which varied between
versions, moral versions were not transmitted wither higher
ﬁdelity than non-moral equivalents (X21= 1.88, p > .05). How-
ever, a higher rating for morally good information was an
important predictor of transmission ﬁdelity, while morally bad
information was not: moral good score was retained as an
effective predictor in all of the three best-ﬁtting models, as
determined by AICc (see Table 1). In addition, morally good
score was a better predictor of recall for the key proposition than
morally bad score (X2= 5.14, p < .001).
Vignette emotion, word count, and participant age and gender
were also important predictors of transmission ﬁdelity. Figure 1
shows the odds ratios for the ﬁxed effects of the best ﬁtting model.
(For details of other models, see SM4).
Comparisons of vignettes with different emotions showed a
number of signiﬁcant differences. Happiness vignettes were
transmitted with greater ﬁdelity than those featuring elevation
(Tukey’s HSD corrected z= 2.76, p < 0.05) and gratitude
(z= 2.75, p < 0.05). Disgust vignettes were transmitted with
greater ﬁdelity than those featuring guilt/shame (z= 4.44,
p < 0.001), happiness (z= 3.75, p < 0.01), elevation (z= 3.79,
p < 0.01) and gratitude (z= 3.39, p < 0.01). Anger vignettes were
transmitted with greater ﬁdelity than those featuring happiness
(z= 2.88, p < 0.05), elevation (z= 3.24, p < 0.05) and gratitude
(z= 2.93, p < 0.05) (all results based on best ﬁtting model, see
SM5 for table).
A multi-model averaging approach (see Burnham and Anderson,
2002; Grueber et al., 2011) was used to determine appropriate effect
estimates (see Fig. 2). Morally good score had a positive effect on
transmission ﬁdelity (estimate= 0.80 ± 0.20 SE, z= 3.92). Higher
male stereotype consistency score had a positive effect on
transmission ﬁdelity (estimate= 0.29 ± 0.28 SE, z= 1.06), while
higher female stereotype consistency score had a small, negative
effect on transmission ﬁdelity (estimate=−0.06 ± 0.19 SE, z=
0.19). Participant age (estimate= 0.09 ± 0.04 SE, z= 2.10) and
vignette word count (estimate= 0.04 ± 0.01 SE, z= 3.41) also had a
small but consistent positive effect on transmission ﬁdelity.
Participant gender had an effect, with women recalling more
propositions, on average, than other participants (estimate=
−0.88 ± 0.44 SE, z= 2.00). Relative variable importance measures
(see Fig. 2) suggest that, of the predictors, good score, emotion,
gender, word count and age were the most important in
determining recall. Furthermore, moral goodness score predicted
recall in every generation (see Fig. 3).
Sensitivity tests. Sensitivity tests were conducted using data from
the second coder to assess the robustness of results based on data
from the original coder. As in the original results, moral versions
of vignettes were not transmitted with higher ﬁdelity than non-
moral versions (vs. generation-only model, X21= .05, p > .05),
suggesting the ﬁnding that there is no general bias for moral
content versus non-moral content is robust. In addition, a higher
rating for morally good information was also an important pre-
dictor in the sensitivity test; moral good was retained in all the
best ﬁtting models while morally bad was not (ΔAIC < 2) and had
a positive effect on transmission ﬁdelity (model average
estimate= 0.60 ± 0.20 SE, z= 2.97), suggesting this ﬁnding was
Fig. 1 Odds ratios with conﬁdence intervals of ﬁxed effects predicting
transmission ﬁdelity in the best ﬁtting model in Study 1 (Model 1 in Table 1).
Odds ratios are sorted from highest to lowest, with the highest at top.
Values to the right of the dashed line indicate a positive effect, values to the
left of the line indicate a negative effect. Produced using sjPlot (Lüdecke,
2016). *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Reference categories are: anger
for emotion, generation 1 for generation, and female for gender
Table 1 Fixed effects, AICc and ΔAIC of the three best ﬁtting
models (ΔAIC < 2) produced in analyses
Model Fixed effects AICc ΔAIC
1 Good+ Emotion+Male stereotype+Age+
Gender+Words+Generation
446.58 0.00
2 Good+ Emotion+Age+Gender+Words
+Generation
447.22 0.64
3 Good+ Emotion+Male stereotype+ Female
stereotype+Age+Gender+Words+
Generation
448.22 1.64
Fig. 2 Predictor effect size indicated by z value and relative variable
importance (maximum value= 1) from the average model based on the
three best ﬁtting models in Study 1. See SM4 for a more complete report of
model-averaged coefﬁcients. aIndicates a categorical variable where mean
z-value is presented
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also robust. For more details on the results of the sensitivity tests
see SM10.
Discussion. The aim of this study was to test three alternative
hypotheses regarding a transmission bias for moral information.
We found no evidence to support H1 (there is a cognitive bias for
transmitting general moral information) or H2 (there is a cog-
nitive bias for transmitting morally bad information). In contrast,
H3 (there is a cognitive bias for transmitting morally good
information) was supported: higher morally good score predicted
higher transmission ﬁdelity, and this is true in all four
‘generations’.
Based on Haidt and Joseph’s (2004) moral foundations theory,
one might expect a recall advantage and a transmission bias for all
morally relevant information, because any information relevant
to the moral foundations would be salient. One might further
expect stories about morally corrupt action to be particularly
culturally potent, given previous research suggesting that negative
information is more salient and viewed as more credible than
equivalent positive information (Baumeister et al., 2001; Fessler
et al., 2014; Rozin and Royzman, 2001). This is not what we
found. Rather, the transmission bias for moral information took
the form of an advantage for morally good content. While this
could be considered counter-intuitive given the extant literature
suggesting a negativity bias in transmission experiments and
cultural artefacts (Bebbington et al., 2016; Brand et al., 2019;
Fessler et al., 2014; Morin and Acerbi, 2017), tales of the morally
virtuous have also been found to be culturally successful in
mythology (Bierlein, 2010). Further, as previously mentioned,
analyses of social media show positively valenced content to be
more successful than negatively valenced content (Ferrara and
Yang, 2015a; Ferrara and Yang, 2015b; Fu et al., 2016), while
children display a bias towards receiving and transmitting
information portraying their in-group as pro-social (Dunham
et al., 2011; Over et al., 2017) and adults display a preference for
transmitting positive vignettes over negative ones (van Leeuwen
et al., 2018). We therefore suggest that a valence-based
transmission bias is dependent on a number of contextual factors
that we discuss further in the general discussion.
Results regarding the other potential predictors are largely
consistent with several key ﬁndings in the literature on
transmission biases. We found that vignettes featuring male-
stereotypical content had high transmission, supporting Lyons
and Kashima’s (2006) ﬁndings. We found, however, that while
male stereotype consistency had a positive effect on transmission
ﬁdelity, female stereotype consistency did not. There are two
possible explanations for this. First, out-group members are
perceived to be more stereotypic than in-group members (Park
and Rothbart, 1982). Because most of our participants were
female, stories about men might have been more likely to be
treated as out-group stories, leading male gender stereotypes to be
more readily accessed. Second, perceived stereotype sharedness
plays a crucial role in how communicable stereotype-consistent
content is (Clark and Kashima, 2007), and gender stereotypes
about men are more homogenous than those about women,
increasing the chance that they will be consistently shared (Wood
and Eagly, 2012). It is also worth noting that the effects of gender
stereotypes were less important than other predictors in terms of
predicting transmission ﬁdelity.
We found that vignettes featuring anger were more effectively
transmitted than vignettes featuring other emotions. This is
consistent with previous research showing a transmission
advantage for content featuring ‘activating’ emotions rather than
‘deactivating’ ones (Berger and Milkman, 2010). We also found
that vignettes featuring disgust had higher transmission ﬁdelity
than a number of other emotions, which is consistent with
research demonstrating an advantage for disgusting content in
transmission (e.g., Eriksson and Coultas, 2014). Our effects of
participant age were very small in size and do not allow
conclusions to be drawn owing to the restricted range and
strongly skewed distribution of participant age. With regards to
word count positively predicting transmission ﬁdelity, partici-
pants may have put more effort into recalling the longer vignettes
because they expected them to be harder to remember, or their
larger size may have made them a more memorable package than
shorter vignettes. Finally, because all but eight of our participants
were female, gender was not a priori a variable of interest, and
there is little existing literature on gender and social transmission
in adults, we refrain from drawing conclusions as to the inﬂuence
of gender. One potential limitation of this study is that an
independent coder coded only a subset of the material. To assess
the reliability of the results sensitivity tests were conducted (see
results section and SM10). These tests suggest the key ﬁndings are
robust.
Study 2
Study 1 demonstrated that emotion played an important role in
the transmission of moral content. It has long been understood
that emotion plays a key role in our moral experience and the
evolution of our moral sense (Gintis et al., 2008; Graham et al.,
2013; Norenzayan, 2014; Pizarro, 2000). As mentioned pre-
viously, previous research in cultural transmission has found an
emotional content bias (Eriksson and Coultas, 2014; Heath et al.,
2001; Stubbersﬁeld et al., 2017). These studies propose that the
mechanism explaining emotional content bias is that more
emotional content elicits a greater physiological response,
resulting in enhanced selection, recall and transmission, however,
their measures of emotional arousal are self-reported ratings of
emotional content, rather than any physiological measure of
arousal. To our knowledge only one study has directly examined
an interaction between physiological arousal and cultural trans-
mission, Berger (2011) found that a physiological excitatory state
(induced through physical exercise) increased the sharing of
information despite the arousal being incidental to the material
being shared.
The present study seeks to replicate and extend on Study 1 by
including a measure of physiological arousal: electrodermal
Fig. 3 Predicted probabilities for the effect of good score (from mean) on
recall by generation, derived from the results of the best-ﬁtting model in
Study 1 (Model 1 in Table 1). Produced using sjPlot (Lüdecke, 2016)
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activity (EDA). EDA measurement has been extensively used to
examine physiological arousal in response to emotional content
(Boucsein, 2012). Study 2 also builds on Study 1 by including
consequences in the narratives, either a reward for morally good
actions or a punishment for morally bad actions. Previous
research demonstrates that the consequences of an action play a
key role in moral judgement and that moral scenarios involving
consequences elicit unique activity in the brain compared to
nonmoral scenarios (Schaich Borg et al., 2006). We therefore
hypothesise that vignettes which include the consequences of a
moral action will be more faithfully transmitted than those which
do not. Based on the results of Study 1 and previous studies
examining emotion and the transmission of narratives we will
examine four hypotheses:
1. There is a cognitive bias for transmitting morally good
information. Consistent with Study 1 and research suggesting a
bias for transmitting positive information in experimental settings
and on social media, morally good information will be pre-
ferentially transmitted over non-moral or morally bad
information (H4).
2. There is a bias for transmitting more physiologically
arousing content. Consistent with previous research suggesting a
bias for more emotional content, content which evokes a stronger
physiological response (as measured using EDA) will be more
faithfully transmitted along a linear chain (H5).
3. There is a bias for transmitting narratives which feature a
consequence for a moral action. Stories which present either a
reward for a morally good action or punishment for morally bad
action will be more faithfully transmitted than those which do
not (H6).
4. Self-reported emotion ratings provide an adequate proxy for
actual emotional arousal. In order to provide an assessment of
previous research which has used self-report measures, we will
compare the EDA measures with self-report measures (H7).
Materials and methods
Participants. Thirty-six participants (27 female, 9 male) aged 18
to 49 years (M= 22.61, SD= 5.40) took part. All participants
gave their informed consent.
Materials. Vignettes were 30 to 68 words and contained 3 to 10
propositions (determined through propositional analysis
(Kintsch, 1974)). As in Study 1, moral and non-moral versions
were created. In addition, versions with consequences and with-
out consequences were included. See below for examples (bolded
sections illustrate differences between versions and did not appear
as such to participants).
Smoothie-Non-moral version
Jackie’s partner read an interview with a famous actor who
drank urine for its supposed health beneﬁts. He decided to try it
out on himself. He added some urine to his breakfast smoothie.
He didn’t see a problem–he hadn’t noticed any difference in the
taste. Jackie felt sickened at the thought.
Smoothie-Non-moral version with consequence
Jackie’s partner read an interview with a famous actor who
drank urine for its supposed health beneﬁts. He decided to try it
out on himself. He added some urine to his breakfast smoothie.
He didn’t see a problem–he hadn’t noticed any difference in the
taste. Jackie felt sickened at the thought. Jackie and her partner
had a big ﬁght about it.
Smoothie-Moral version
Jackie’s partner read an interview with a famous actor who
drank urine for its supposed health beneﬁts. He decided to try it
out on the kids. He added some urine to their breakfast
smoothie. He didn’t see a problem—they hadn’t noticed any
difference in the taste. Jackie felt sickened at the thought.
Smoothie-Moral version with consequences
Jackie’s partner read an interview with a famous actor who
drank urine for its supposed health beneﬁts. He decided to try it
out on the kids. He added some urine to their breakfast
smoothie. He didn’t see a problem—they hadn’t noticed any
difference in the taste. Jackie felt sickened at the thought. Jackie
and her partner had a big ﬁght about it.
As in Study 1, the results of a pre-test were used to determine
the eight vignettes most appropriate for analyses, using the same
survey as the Study 1 pre-test (see SM1, SM6, and SM7).
EDA equipment and measurement. EDA was measured using a
Biopac MP36R system operating AcqKnowledge 4.4 software,
sampling at 50 Hz, with a gain level of ×1000 and a high pass ﬁlter
of .05. EDA responses for each participant were identiﬁed as the
maximum phasic skin conductance response measured while
reading each vignette (no recordings were taken when typing or
not reading). To correct for individual differences, response
scores were range corrected, that is each score was calculated as a
proportion of that participants total EDA range. Settings and
measurement were informed by Braithwaite et al. (2013) and pilot
studies conducted by the researchers.
Design. As in Study 1, a linear transmission chain design was
used. As in previous research, three ‘generations’ were used
(Barrett and Nyhoff, 2001; Nielson et al., 2012; Stubbersﬁeld et al.,
2015; Stubbersﬁeld et al., 2017) across twelve chains. The ﬁrst
participant in each of the twelve chains received all eight vign-
ettes. Participants received an equal mix of moral, non-moral,
moral with consequences and non-moral with consequences.
Procedure. The procedure matched that of Study 1, with the
addition of EDA measurement. Participants attached pre-gelled
electrodes to their own palms with instruction from the
researcher, who also checked they were attached appropriately.
The researcher remained in the room to monitor the EDA
readout and participant activity for actions which could inﬂuence
the EDA measurement (i.e., coughing, excessive movement).
Coding. Recalled material was coded for the presence of propo-
sitions found in the original version. Coding reliability was
assessed by having an independent coder, blind to the hypothesis,
code 11% of the material. The independent coder and experi-
menter were highly consistent (r= 0.92, p < 001). In cases of
disagreement the ﬁrst coder’s decision stood. Sensitivity tests were
conducted to assess coder reliability (see below and SM10).
Statistical analysis. To test H4 and H5 analyses followed that of
Study 1 using the same software and R packages. A GLMM was
constructed to predict the proportion of original propositions
correctly recalled, including participant age, participant gender,
word count, number of propositions, moral good score, moral
bad score, survival information score, social information score,
male stereotype consistency score, female stereotype consistency
score, emotion, EDA score, and generation as ﬁxed effects, with
nested effects of vignette in participant, participant in generation,
and generation in vignette set. Predictors were removed if doing
so did not impair model ﬁt, determined by AIC. As before, no
speciﬁc ΔAIC was used to determine predictor removal but all
models with ΔAIC < 2 relative to the best-ﬁtting model were
included in model averaging (see SM4 for AICs of each model
produced). All non-categorical variables were centred on
the mean.
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To test H6 a GLMM was constructed to predict the proportion
of original propositions correctly recalled with moral category
(categories being moral-no-consequences (M), moral-
consequences (MC), non-moral-no-consequences (N), and non-
moral-consequences (NC)) as a ﬁxed effect, with the same
random effects as the H4 and H5 GLMM. To test H7 a version of
the best ﬁtting model was created in which EDA score was
replaced with emotional rating score, and the effect on model ﬁt
evaluated.
Results. As in Study 1, a higher rating for morally good infor-
mation was an important predictor of transmission ﬁdelity: moral
good score was retained as an effective predictor in all of the ﬁve
best-ﬁtting models, as determined by AICc. EDA score was less
important as a predictor of transmission ﬁdelity, being retained in
four of the ﬁve best-ﬁtting models (see Table 2). The moral
proposition appearing in the original material was recalled in the
majority cases (77.08%), and the moral proposition survived to
the end of the majority of chains where it was present in the
original material (58.33%). Morally good score was also a better
predictor of recall for the key proposition than morally bad score
(X2= 0.59, p < .001).
Vignette emotion and participant gender were also important
predictors of transmission ﬁdelity. Figure 4 shows the odds ratios
for the ﬁxed effects of the best ﬁtting model in Study 2 (Model 1
in Table 2). (For details of other models, see SM8).
Pairwise comparisons of vignettes featuring different emotions
showed that disgust vignettes were transmitted more faithfully
than vignettes featuring either gratitude (Tukey’s HSD corrected
z=−3.43, p < 0.005) or elevation (z=−3.13, p < 0.01). No other
signiﬁcant differences between emotions were found (zs=−0.57
to 1.28, ps > 0.05). (See SM5).
A multi-model averaging approach (see Study 1) was used to
determine appropriate effect estimates (see Fig. 5). Morally good
score had a positive effect on transmission ﬁdelity
(estimate= 0.38 ± 0.11 SE, z= 3.56) while EDA score had a less
consistent but negative effect on transmission ﬁdelity (estimate=
−0.70 ± 0.66 SE, z= 1.06). Participant gender had an effect, with
women recalling more propositions, on average, than other
participants (estimate=−1.13 ± 0.33 SE, z= 3.38). Vignette
word count had a small negative effect (estimate=−0.03 ± 0.03
SE, z= 1.12). Higher female stereotype consistency score had a
small positive effect on transmission ﬁdelity (estimate= 0.16 ±
0.29 SE, z= 0.54), while higher male stereotype consistency score
had a small negative effect on transmission ﬁdelity (estimate=
−0.03 ± 0.12 SE, z= 0.27). Relative variable importance measure
(see Fig. 5) suggest that, of the predictors, good score, emotion
and gender were the most important in determining recall. Each
of these variables was also retained in the best-ﬁtting models from
Study 1 with different participants and material. The effect of
good score was again present in all generations, as it was in Study
1 (see Fig. 6).
To test H7 a version of the best ﬁtting model was created using
emotional rating score in place of EDA score. In this model
emotional rating also had a negative effect on transmission
ﬁdelity (estimate=−0.57 ± 0.37 SE, z=−1.52). When these two
models were compared, the model with emotional rating score
proved to be a better ﬁt to the data than the model using EDA
score (X2= 0.14, p < 0.001), however, the difference in model ﬁt
is small (ΔAIC < 2).
Consequences (Moral and Nonmoral vs Moral with Con-
sequences and Nonmoral with Consequences) is a signiﬁcant
predictor of transmission ﬁdelity (vs. generation-only model,
X23= 10.31, p= .02), however, vignettes without consequences
Table 2 Fixed effects, AICc and ΔAIC of the ﬁve best ﬁtting models (ΔAIC < 2) produced in the analysis
Model Fixed effects AICc ΔAIC
1 Good+ Emotion+ EDA score+Gender+Words+Generation 352.98 0.00
2 Good+ Emotion+Gender+Words+Generation 353.00 0.02
3 Good+ Emotion+ EDA score+Gender+Generation 353.01 0.04
4 Good+ Emotion+ EDA score+Gender+Words+Generation+ Female stereotype 353.25 0.28
5 Good+ Emotion+ EDA score+Gender+Words+Generation+ Female stereotype+Male Stereotype 354.26 1.29
Fig. 4 Odds ratios with conﬁdence intervals of ﬁxed effects predicting
transmission ﬁdelity in the best ﬁtting model in Study 2 (Model 1 in Table
2). Odds ratios are sorted from highest to lowest, with the highest at top.
Values to the right of the dashed line indicate a positive effect, values to the
left of the line indicate a negative effect. Produced using sjPlot (Lüdecke,
2016). *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Reference categories are: anger
for emotion, generation 1 for generation, and female for gender
Fig. 5 Predictor effect size indicated by z value and relative variable
importance (maximum value= 1) from the average model based on the ﬁve
best ﬁtting models for Study 2. See SM8 for a more complete report of
model-averaged coefﬁcients. aIndicates a categorical variable where mean
z-value is presented
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(moral and non-moral) were transmitted more faithfully than
their no-consequences equivalents (estimate= 0.55, SE= 0.26,
z= 2.15, p < 0.05). Multiple pair-wise comparisons show that this
primarily driven by the difference between Moral and Nonmoral
with Consequences vignettes (z=−3.04, p < 0.05), no other
signiﬁcant differences between vignette types were found (zs=
−2.18 to −0.00, ps > 0.05).
Sensitivity tests. Sensitivity tests were conducted using data from
the second coder to assess the robustness of results based on data
from the original coder. As in the original results, morally good
information was an important predictor, being retained in all the
best ﬁtting models, while EDA Score was not (ΔAIC < 2). In
addition, morally good score again had a positive effect on
transmission ﬁdelity (model average estimate= 0.36 ± 0.10 SE,
z= 3.81) while EDA score had a less consistent but negative effect
on transmission ﬁdelity (model average estimate=−0.24 ± 0.50
SE, z= 0.48), suggesting these ﬁndings are also robust. Con-
sequences were not a signiﬁcant predictor of transmission (vs
generation only model, X23= 6.63, p= .08). Emotional rating
score proved to be a better ﬁt to the data than the model using
EDA score (X2= 5.38, p < 0.001) but both were negative pre-
dictors of transmission ﬁdelity. For more details on the results of
the sensitivity tests see SM10.
Discussion. The aim of this study was to test four hypotheses
regarding a transmission bias for morally good content and the
inﬂuence of physiological arousal on transmission. Consistent
with the ﬁndings of Study 1, we found evidence to support H4
(there is a cognitive bias for transmitting morally good infor-
mation). As in Study 1, this was true across all ‘generations’ (See
Fig. 6). We found no evidence to support H5 (there is a bias for
transmitting more physiologically arousing content), in fact the
opposite was found. We also found no evidence to support H6
(there is a bias for transmitting narratives which feature a con-
sequence for a moral action). We did, however, ﬁnd evidence in
support of H7 (self-reported emotion ratings provide an adequate
proxy for actual emotional arousal). Self-reported emotion ratings
negatively predict recall, as EDA measures do, suggesting that it is
appropriate to use self-report measures for emotional content in
future research.
Previous research examining an emotional bias in cultural
transmission has found that emotive information (as determined
through self-report measures) has a positive inﬂuence on
transmission ﬁdelity (Eriksson and Coultas, 2014; Heath et al.,
2001; Stubbersﬁeld et al., 2017). The explanation given for this
ﬁnding is that emotive information is physiologically arousing,
which makes it more memorable and more likely to be selected
for transmission. Our ﬁnding that physiological arousal (as
measured through EDA) had a negative effect on transmission
ﬁdelity is inconsistent with this proposed mechanism and
therefore with this previous research. To examine this ﬁnding
further, in the context of our study, another GLMM was
constructed predicting EDA score rather than recall, but
otherwise the same as those models constructed to predict recall.
A full model found that morally good content had a negative
effect on EDA score (estimate=−0.36 ± 0.21 SE, z= 0.08),
suggesting the vignettes with a higher morally good score were
less physiologically arousing than other vignettes.
We therefore propose that the role of emotion and physiolo-
gical arousal in cultural transmission is not a direct one, but one
that increases transmission by making content more salient when
memorability is the primary determinant of transmission success.
Clark and Kashima (2007) demonstrated that participants’
knowledge of their recall being transmitted to another person
in a transmission chain produced different results from chains
where they were not aware. They argued that participants’
awareness of transmission led to communicative intent, produ-
cing a different result relative to the recall-only chains. In our
experiment, transmission to another participant was also known,
likely leading to a combination of recall and communicative
intent where memorability (and hence arousal) may not have
been the most inﬂuential factor. We suggest that less arousing
content did not have a transmission advantage in our study
because it was less arousing, but rather because the content bias
for morally good content was a more important determinant of
transmission success than memorability. This proposal is
supported by van Leeuwen et al. (2018), who found that
participants more frequently chose to transmit positive, low-
arousal vignettes over negative, high arousal ones when
transmission was to strangers. Further research is required to
examine fully the role of arousal, memory, communicative intent
and audience perception in the transmission of moral content
and suggestions for future research are discussed in the general
discussion.
We found no support for the hypothesis that vignettes which
featured a consequence for moral actions would be more
faithfully transmitted. The results instead suggested that vign-
ettes with consequences were less faithfully transmitted than
those without consequences. However, pairwise comparison
suggests that this ﬁnding was driven by the differences in
transmission ﬁdelity between Moral vignettes and Nonmoral
with Consequences vignettes. A key ﬁnding in studies examining
the cultural transmission of narratives has been the process of
sense-making and stories being altered to ﬁt the transmitters’
schema (Bartlett, 1932; Lyons and Kashima, 2006), therefore,
that Nonmoral with Consequences vignettes were not faithfully
transmitted may be better explained by the apparent incongruity
between the non-moral, unintentional action having some form
of punishment or reward as a consequence of it, than stories
without consequences having some form of advantage in
transmission. An appropriate interpretation of this result,
therefore, is that in this case the inclusion of consequences had
no clear direct effect, positive or negative, on the transmission of
moral information.
We found that vignettes featuring female-stereotypical content
had high transmission, supporting Lyons and Kashima’s (2006)
ﬁndings. We found, however, that while female stereotype
consistency had a positive effect on transmission ﬁdelity, male
stereotype consistency did not. This ﬁnding is inconsistent with
the ﬁnding of Study 1. It is again worth noting that, as in Study 1,
the effects of gender stereotypes were less important than other
predictors in terms of predicting transmission ﬁdelity. It is
Fig. 6 Predicted probabilities for the effect of good score (from mean) on
recall by generation, derived from the results of the best-ﬁtting model in
Study 2 (Model 1 in Table 2). Produced using sjPlot (Lüdecke, 2016)
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possible, therefore, that both studies give valid but noisy estimates
of the same, small, ‘true’ effect of stereotype consistency. We also
found that vignettes featuring disgust had higher transmission
ﬁdelity than a number of other emotions, which is consistent with
research demonstrating an advantage for disgusting content in
transmission (e.g., Eriksson and Coultas, 2014). Unlike Study 1,
word count had a negative effect on transmission ﬁdelity, with
longer vignettes being more poorly transmitted. However, in
Study 2, word count was confounded with the presence of
consequences. This is likely to explain the inconsistency between
Study 1 and Study 2 with regard to the effects of word count.
Because all but nine of our participants were female, gender was
not a priori a variable of interest, and there is little existing
literature on gender and social transmission in adults, we refrain
from drawing conclusions as to the inﬂuence of gender. To assess
the reliability of the results, sensitivity tests were again conducted
(see results section and SM10), and again found that the key
ﬁndings are robust.
General discussion
The primary purpose of the studies presented here was to
examine the transmission of moral information, while examining
the inﬂuence of physiological arousal, emotion, and other pre-
dictors on that transmission. While we found no evidence of a
general bias for moral information in transmission, in two studies
with separate participants and materials we found an advantage
for information rated as morally good. This could be considered
counter-intuitive in the context of the negativity bias literature
(Baumeister et al., 2001; Brand et al., 2019; Fessler et al., 2014;
Morin and Acerbi, 2017; Rozin and Royzman, 2001), however, we
now consider a possible functional reason for the preferential
sharing of morally good content.
Stories of morally good actions might be preferentially trans-
mitted because they appear to reinforce a shared moral norm,
thereby serving a socially connective function between potential
afﬁliates. Clark and Kashima (2007) argued that the transmission
advantage for stereotype-consistent information arose because
sharing stereotypes facilitated a perceived bond between parti-
cipants. Our participants were aware that the products of their
recall would be read and recalled by another participant. It may
be that participants unconsciously enhanced their transmission
of the morally good stories in order to convey a positive
impression of themselves and their social norms to the next
individual in the chain. Socially connective content may be more
likely to be preferentially transmitted when building new social
connections is important (i.e., receivers are unknown). Morality
is important in impression formation and categorisation (van
Leeuwen et al., 2012; Wojciszke et al., 1998; Ybarra et al., 2001),
and impression formation is particularly prone to negativity bias
(Lupfer et al., 2000; Rozin and Royzman, 2001). Participants may
therefore be selectively transmitting positively valenced
descriptions of morally good actions to avoid the contaminating
effect of negatively valenced descriptions of morally bad actions
on the impressions formed of them by strangers. We provide
support for this hypothesis in SM9, which presents a supple-
mentary study using the same material in which we ﬁnd no
advantage for moral information (whether good or bad) in
individual recall. This supports the suggestion that our main
result was driven by communicative intent rather than the
memorability of morally good information. Further, an
impression-driven mechanism behind the preferential trans-
mission of morally good information also can also explain the
ﬁnding that the inclusion of consequences had no effect (in
Study 2). If morally good information is being preferentially
transmitted to avoid the contaminating effect of morally bad
information, then whether that moral action is rewarded or not
is irrelevant.
Our interpretation is supported by previous research which
suggests that the expression of self-identity plays an important
role in moral expression (Crockett, 2017). It is particularly sup-
ported by van Leeuwen et al. (2018), who found that participants
more frequently chose to transmit positive, low-arousal vignettes
over negative, high arousal ones when transmission was to
strangers, suggesting that seeking social connection might inﬂu-
ence transmission preferences. Further, unlike the negativity bias
found in trends in emotional expression in art (see Brand et al.,
2019; Morin and Acerbi, 2017), examination of trends in the
cultural salience of moral terms shows no clear, linear trend
(Wheeler et al., 2019), suggesting that the transmission of moral
information may be particularly dependant on contextual factors.
Further research is required to examine fully the role of arousal,
memory, communicative intent and audience perception in the
transmission of moral content. A limitation of the current study is
the use of the vignettes’ original properties as a predictor of recall
along a transmission chain and future research examining the
transmission of moral information could address this. A purely
selection-based paradigm with variable audiences could be used
to assess effects of communicative intent and audience perception
(similarly to van Leeuwen et al., 2018) or the relative effects of
memorability and communicative intent could be examined
through comparing recall-only and transmission-aware chains (as
in Clark and Kashima, 2007). Future research could also allow
participants to deliberately alter text (as in Stubbersﬁeld et al.,
2018) to further assess the inﬂuence of communicative intent on
the transmission of moral information.
Our results show that the preferential transmission of morally
good content is not simply the result of a bias for social content. It
is also distinct from a bias associated for emotional content, as
indicated by separable effects in our models. With regard to
emotions, there were few clear patterns, except for the more
unambiguously ‘activating’ emotions having an advantage over
other, less ‘activating’ emotions. However, that EDA score had a
negative effect on transmission ﬁdelity suggests that arousal may
not be the mechanism behind this ﬁnding. Our results regarding
EDA suggest that the role of emotion in social transmission is
that it interacts with other, perhaps more important factors
including the context in which transmission takes place and the
nature of informational content. In the case of Study 2, morally
good information was more transmissible, likely because of the
reasons discussed above. While our results did suggest that self-
reported emotional ratings of content are a useful measure, we
would encourage further research using physiological measures to
properly assess the mechanisms involved in the transmission of
emotional material.
Our studies provide the ﬁrst evidence of a content bias in social
transmission that speciﬁcally favours content related to morality.
Further, our results suggest that the content bias speciﬁcally
favours morally good information. We propose that this bias
likely functions as a transmitter bias, favouring the transmission
to another individual of content that may serve a socially con-
nective purpose, rather than as a receiver bias, favouring the
encoding and recall of content which may be advantageous at the
individual level. The selective communication of content relating
to moral virtue might avoid negative impression formation and
promote social bonding, and this might partially explain the
success of morality-related content in human culture. It should be
noted that while the bias for moral content can be distinguished
from a bias for social or emotional content in the lab, these biases
are unlikely to operate completely separately in real-world con-
texts. Moral information is often emotionally charged, social, and
survival-relevant.
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Data availability
The datasets generated and analysed during the current study are
available in the Dataverse repository: https://doi.org/10.7910/
DVN/LADWHL. Data produced from the EDA measurement are
not publicly available due to their large size but are available from
the corresponding author on reasonable request.
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